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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
    The latter half of the twentieth century saw the remarkable growth performance of 
the East Asian economies. In Fig. 1.1, the average annual growth rates of the real per-
capita GDP of 131 economies between 1960 and 1990 are plotted against those of the 
real per-capita trade volume.' This figure tells us two points. First, the world economy 
was getting more and more open over the years. The slope of the regression line in Fig. 
1.1 is flatter than that of the 45-degree line, implying that trade expanded at a higher 
rate than income. Second, the fastest-growing East Asian economies experienced the 
fastest growth of trade. All of the eight HPAEs (High-Performing Asian Economies: 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea Republic, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
 Thailand)2 are located in the far northeastern side of the whole data in Fig. 1.1. Facing 
these facts, we conjecture that examining the links between trade and growth is 
important in understanding the secret of the East Asian miracle. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to give some theoretical frameworks for analyses of the relationships 
between i ternational trade, economic growth and  development.' 
    Economists have used two criteria of economic growth in developing economies. 
The first is an absolute one: how fast does a developing economy grow no matter how 
fast the other economies grow? According to this view, only resource allocation in the 
developing economy matters. The second is a relative one: how fast does a developing 
economy grow compared with the other economies? This view brings up not only 
resource allocation in the developing economy but also income distribution i the world. 
In the context of trade and growth, the economists have asked two questions each of 
which corresponds to each criterion. 
    First, how does trade policy affect growth and welfare? In practice, most 
governments in the world are imposing a variety of trade barriers for several reasons: 
1 Source: Summers and Heston (1994). Economies with at least 20 years of observation arechosen 
as the sample. 
2 The World Bank (1993) has begun to use this grouping. 
3 We define conomic growth as a rise in the real national income, and economic development as an 
overall rise in the real income ofevery class. Then logically economic growth isthe necessary 
condition for economic development. From now on, we do not distinguish between these terms and 
mainly use "economic growth" inorder to begin with macroeconomic rather than microeconomic 
analysis. 
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they protect declining industries under pressure from strong interest groups; they find 
collecting revenues at customs easier than from domestic households and firms given 
their tax structure; they seek to bring up infant industries which are "promised" to lead 
the economies in the future. Can these trade barriers be justified in the light of growth 
and welfare? Or is free trade the best? 
    Second, can developingSouthern economies catch up with developed Northern 
economies? The data gives an ambiguous answer. Fig. 1.2 plots the average annual 
growth rates of the real per-capita GDP of 103 economies between 1960 and 1990 
against the logarithmic values of the real per-capita GDP in  1960.4 It shows that most of 
the HPAEs grew faster than the developed OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) economies and were catching up, while most of the other 
developing economies grew slower than the developed economies and were not 
catching up. Does the income of South really converge to that of North? If so, in what 
case? 
    The purpose of this chapter is to find a clue for solving these questions. Section 
1.2 argues that the open endogenous growth theory is the appropriate analytical tool. 
Next, we make a survey on the open endogenous growth  theory.5 Section 1.3 examines 
the effect of trade policy on growth and welfare. Section 1.4 deals with convergence 
controversy. Section 1.5 focuses on technology transfer, a topic derived from section 1.4. 
Finally, section 1.6 gives an introduction tothe following chapters. 
1.2 Why endogenous growth? 
    To consider the questions raised in section 1.1, we apply the endogenous growth 
theory to open economies. In the endogenous growth models, the growth rate6 is 
endogenously determined by policy as well as technology, endowment, and preference. 
Neither the traditional trade theory nor the neoclassical growth theory is helpful to 
examine the relationships between trade and growth. 
    The traditional trade theory is not goodat analyzing dynamic problems, ince the 
theory is essentially static. There are two topics which relates growth to trade. First, the 
immizerizing rowth argument says that an open economy might be hurt by growth 
4 Source: Summers and Heston (1994). 
5 For the other surveys on the open endogenous growth eory, see Aghion and Howitt (1998, Chap. 
11) and Long and Wong (1997). 
6 Without  comment, the term "the growth rate" usually means the growth rate of the real per-capita 
national income. 
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either when growth is biased toward an export good so that he terms of trade worsen 
sufficiently, (Bhagwati 1958) or when growth is biased toward a tariff-ridden import 
good so that the tariff revenue shrink sufficiently. (Johnson 1967) Second, the infant 
industry argument s ates that it might be good to protect the infant industry, in which 
firms can not operate in free trade, but will be able to do after having sufficient amount 
of production  experience.' By protecting the infant industry, the economy will produce 
or even export the good which would be imported in free trade. Although these 
arguments explain the causality from growth to trade, they do not explicitly formulate 
the mechanics ofgrowth. 
    Nor is theneoclassical growth theory satisfactory, since it has no route by which 
trade affects the growth rate in the steady state, the state in which all variables grow at 
constant rates. The neoclassical growth theory since Solow (1956) is characterized by
the neoclassical constant-returns-to-scale production functions and diminishing returns 
to reproducible factors such as  capital.' Since Oniki and Uzawa (1965) developed a 
two-sector, two-factor, two-economy model, many papers on the open neoclassical 
growth theory had been written until 1970s.9 It is true that he open neoclassical growth 
models analyze the interactions between trade and growth: capital accumulation affects 
the production possibility and then the volume of trade, while trade affects the volume 
of investment good available for use and then capital accumulation. However, as  long as 
the neoclassical properties are preserved, the steady-state  growth rate is entirely 
determined bythe rate of exogenous technological progress. 
    Since the mid-1980s, the endogenous growththeory has been developed in order 
to explain the determinants of growth by logical reasoning within the models. We need 
the endogenous growth models in order to discuss how various trading environments 
affect growth and welfare of developing economies. 
1.3 Trade policy, growth and welfare 
    How does trade policy affect growth and welfare? It seems at first glance that an 
economy achieves higher growth rate and welfare, the more open trade policy the 
government takes. Dollar (1992), Edwards (1992), and Sachs and Warner (1995), 
 For surveys on the infant industry argument, see Corden (1974, Chap. 9) and Itoh et al. (1991, 
Chap. 4). 
K The neoclassical properties n production technology are stated inBarro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 
 pp.  16). 9 For a survey on the neoclassical growth eory in open economies, see Findlay (1984, Sec. 2.3). 
                           3
among others, empirically support this view. However, in a recent paper, Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (1999) point out methodological flaws in these early papers and rerun some 
revised regressions to find little evidence that the open trade policy is significantly 
associated with growth. Facing this ambiguous fact, the theory has to explain in what 
case openness i good for growth and in what case it is bad. 
    In this section, we concentrate on the small-open endogenous growth models. 
This is largely because the knowledge obtained in the small-open models is 
indispensable to consider the same things in the multi-economy models. Moreover, the 
multi-economy models are too complex to analyze the whole effect of a policy change: 
the time path of terms of trade changes; the vector of state variables hows transitional 
dynamics until the system reaches the new steady state. As the readers who are familiar 
with public economics know, the effect of trade policy depends on whether the economy 
is inherited with some kinds of market failure such as externalities, imperfect 
competition, and so on. 
Models without market failure 
    Let us first graspthe basic structure of the endogenous growth models in 
competitive s ttings. Suppose that good  Y is produced under the following production 
function: 
 Y = F(K,Z), 
where K and Z denote representative reproducible factor (e.g., capital) and other 
input, respectively. It is assumed that  F•) has positive and diminishing marginal 
products and exhibits constant returns to scale. A factor is said to be reproducible when 
their supply is not constrained by exogenous elements. The per-capita output continues 
to grow if the value of marginal product of K  (VMPK) has a sufficiently high 
asymptotic lower bound as K becomes large. There are two distinct conditions which 
give rise to the boundedness of VMPK  : 
• Z is also reproducible. (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Barro 1990, among  others') 
 10 In Romer (1986), K enters in Z as the Marshallian external economies. In Lucas (1988), Z is 
reproducible human capital. InBarro (1990), publicly provided production services appear in  Z  . 
They retain the perfect-competition paradigm, although Romer (1986) and Barro (1990) assume 
market failure. 
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• Z is not essential for production. (Solow 1956, Sec. 4) 
In either of these cases, the market mechanism endogenously determines the growth rate 
of the per-capita national income in the steady  state.' 
    Lee (1993, Sec. 3) provides a simplemodel to show that free trade is growth-
maximizing. He assumes that final good Y is produced from capital K and foreign 
intermediate good M under the neoclassical production function. We normalize the 
world price of M to unity, since its value has no qualitative importance. The first-order 
conditions of profit maximization are given by 
                    r =FK(K,M)  =  FK(K  1  M  ,1), 
 1+r  =  Fm(K,M)=Fm(KIM,1), 
where r and  r denote interest rate and ad-valorem tariff rate, respectively, and a 
subscript represents differentiation with respect to the  argument.' The second equality 
in each condition follows since the first partial derivative of the homogeneous-of-
degree-one function  F(• is homogeneous of degree zero. Given  r,  KIM is 
determined from the second condition, and then r is determined from the first 
condition. In this model, the  'VMPK does not decline with capital accumulation over 
time, because M is also reproducible: firms can buy as much amount of M as they 
want at the given domestic price. Thus, endogenous growth occurs in the steady  state.' 
Noting that the supply of K is fixed at each point in time, raising  r decreases the 
demand for  M  , which in turn pulls down the VMPK  .14 Consequently, the steady-state 
growth rate is decreasing in the tariff rate. 
    Osang and Pereira (1996) present amodel with physical and human capital, and 
numerically examine the effects of imposing several tariffs on the growth rate. In their 
model, final good is produced from physical and human capital under the neoclassical 
technology, so that the growth rate mainly depends on how the two types of capital are 
accumulated. Firms accumulate physical capital using domestic final good and foreign 
investment good, while accumulate human capital using a fraction of human capital and 
11 For a review of several prototype endogenous growth models, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
 12  The VMP
K  is equal to rental, which in turn is equal to the interest plus depreciation rate because 
of the no-arbitrage condition. We neglect capital depreciation ly for simplicity. 
13 Furthermore, the economy isalways in the steady state, because there is only one state variable 
that evolves over time and can not be chosen perfectly freely in each period. 
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foreign technology good. Households consume domestic final good and foreign 
consumption good. Let us concentrate on the effect of a consumption tariff on the 
steady-state growth rate.15 If the tariff revenue is transferred to the households in a 
lump-sum manner, aising the tariff rate has no growth effect, since the tariff does not 
affect he incentive of accumulating physical and human capital. If the tariff revenue is 
used for subsidizing investment in physical capital, however, the growth rate rises with 
the tariff rate. Note that he growth rate is independent from the pure effect of the tariff 
in any case. 
    The welfare effect of any kind of tariff is necessarily negative in these models. 
This is because they assume no market failure. In the absence of market failure, the 
competitive quilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. Then any form of government 
intervention, including tariffs, results in an allocation which is inferior to the 
competitive equilibrium one. Therefore, free trade is optimal in these models. 
Models with market failure 
    Romer (1990)and Grossman and Helpman (1991a) have made an innovation in 
the field of growth theory by means of their models with endogenous technological 
change. In their R&D models with expanding product variety, the central feature is that 
technology exhibits increasing returns due to specialization, which is named by Romer 
(1987). Let us assume the following production function: 
            X =  G({x(j)}  7=0) =  x(j)" dj)ii  ;  a  E  (0,1), 
where  X  ,  x(j), and n denote index of differentiated goods, variety j  E[0,  n] of 
differentiated good, and continuous measure of the number of varieties of differentiated 
goods, respectively. When the varieties of differentiated goods are regarded as 
intermediate (or consumption) goods, X represents he output of final good or the 
composite of intermediate goods (or utility). Given  n  ,  G(• is constant returns to scale 
in all varieties. However, noting that x(j) =  xVj, we have 
                           X=  nitax =  n(1-a)i (nx).
 "We use  Fmm  <  0,  Fix  <  0, and  FKKK +  FPM = 0 (Euler's formula) toget his outcome. 
15  If the ratio f physical tohuman capital in the initial period is different from that in the steady state, 
the economy exhibits ransitional dynamics before reaching the steady state. 
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Given the total quantity of differentiated goods nx, X is larger, the larger n is. That 
is, increasing division of labor among different varieties i good for productivity. In this 
type of models, endogenous growth is driven by profit-maximizing R&D firms which 
successively create new varieties. The major market failure lies in the differentiated 
good sector: each firm producing variety  j  , believing that its decision does not affect 
the entire sector, takes monopoly pricing. 
    Grossman and Helpman(1991b) apply the structure of the R&D models to a 
small open economy, and investigate he possibility of growth- and welfare-enhancing 
trade policy. In their model, there are two perfectly competitive final good sectors, one 
monopolistically competitive intermediate good sector, one perfectly competitive R&D 
sector, and two primary factors, skilled and unskilled labor. High-tech good is produced 
from intermediate goods and skilled labor, while low-tech good is produced from 
intermediate goods and unskilled labor. After paying for a blueprint as a fixed cost, each 
intermediate good firm produces avariety from skilled and unskilled labor, and sets its 
price above the marginal cost to earn monopoly profit which just covers the fixed cost. 
In the R&D sector, firms use skilled labor to produce blueprints for new  varieties.' 
Here the Marshallian external economies work: an R&D firm's production experience 
contributes to all R&D firms' knowledge in a non-appropriable way. This is another 
market falilure. In this model, the growth effect depends on which sector is protected. 
Assuming diversification, an import tariff on high-tech (or low-tech) good raises (or 
lowers) the wage of skilled  labor,'' which in turn decreases (or increases) the demand 
for skilled labor in the R&D sector and then pulls down (or pushes up) the growth rate. 
On the other hand, the welfare effect is ambiguous. Starting from free trade, an import 
tariff on low-tech good improves resource allocation by correcting insufficient incentive 
for R&D. If the tariff raises the marginal cost of the intermediate good firms, however, 
efficiency deteriorates due to further decrease in the output of underproduced 
intermediate goods. The welfare ffect depends on which of these two effects dominates 
the other. 
    Fung and Ishikawa (1992) model a simplified version of Grossman and Helpman 
(1991b) to discover the zero-growth equilibrium for some range of initial condition. 
Their model has two final good sectors, one intermediate good sector, one R&D sector, 
and (in effect) one primary factor, labor. High-tech good is produced from intermediate 
16 We can alternatively suppose that each intermediate good firm directly carries out R&D before 
entry. Both specifications yield the same outcomes. 
17 This is an application of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 
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goods, while low-tech good is produced from labor under decreasing returns. 
Production of both intermediate goods and blueprints requires only labor. They neglect 
household behavior by assuming that the interest rate as well as the relative price of 
final goods is exogenously given in the world market. For R&D to be active, sufficient 
amount of labor must leave the low-tech sector. Given the relative price, the larger (or 
smaller) is the number of varieties, the higher (or lower) is the marginal revenue product 
of labor in the intermediate good sector, and hence the less (or more) labor the low-tech 
firms employ. If the number of varieties is larger than some critical value in the initial 
period, the economy experiences growth, during which labor moves from the low-tech 
to the high-tech and the R&D sectors. Otherwise, the economy can not grow by itself. A 
production tax on the low-tech sector may make the zero-growth economy take off by 
releasing labor from that  sector.' 
1.4 Convergence or divergence 
    Can developingSouthern economies catch up with developed Northern 
economies? The absolute convergence hypothesis is derived from the neoclassical 
growth theory in a closed economy. It predicts that poor economies tend to grow faster 
than rich ones, since the former has larger growth potential which is reflected in higher 
marginal product of capital. As Fig. 1.2 indicates, however, there seems to be no 
negative correlation between the growth rate and the initial income. 
    One solution to this difficulty is to modify the concept of convergence. The 
conditional convergence hypothesis means that "an economy grows faster the further it 
is from its own steady-state value." (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995, pp. 28) Formally, it
is expected that the coefficient of the initial income will be significantly negative, after 
controlling for parameters which characterize the steady-state level of the economy's 
income. (e.g., saving rate, population growth rate, human capital, etc.) Mankiw et al. 
(1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1996), among others, get the desired result. It should be noted 
that this "classical approach to convergence analysis" (named by Sala-i-Martin 1996) 
rests on the neoclassical growth theory in a closed economy. In other words, this 
approach assumes that he world consists of many isolated  economies.' 
18 Ishikawa (1992) gives aperfect ompetition model with the Marshallian external economies n a
producer service sector, which as the same role as the R&D sector inFung and Ishikawa (1992), 
and obtains similar results. 
19 Quah (1996) criticizes this approach and sets out an alternative hypothesis that the world income 
distribution exhibits win peaks: economies t nd to be split into two convergence clubs, rich and 
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    If we want to explain theoretically how trade in goods and ideas affects 
convergence between North and South, it is better to formulate the multi-economy 
endogenous growth models. The following results suggest that whether technology is 
transferred from North to South, either directly or indirectly, is essential for 
convergence. 
    Lucas (1988, Sec. 5) develops a multi-economy model to illustrate the divergence 
of growth rates across economies. Although his model has a continuum of small 
economies, we now present i s two-economy version. In economy i (i =  N,S), where 
N and S represent North and South, respectively, good j  ( j  =1,2)  311 isproduced 
according to 
 17!  = 
 I .1' 
where and  ui. denote knowledge and labor demand in sector  j, respectively. The 
labor supply is fixed to unity. It is assumed that is external to firms. Knowledge is 
accumulated through  learning-by-doing: 
                           .7I
                                =.y! 
 
.1' 
where  8f is a productivity parameter which is common to the two economies, and a dot 
over a variable represents differentiation with respect to time. Suppose that  61 > 62: 
high-tech sector 1 is better at accumulating knowledge than low-tech sector 2. The fact 
that he increase in knowledge in sector j in economy i depends solely on the output 
of its own implies that there are neither intersectoral nor international knowledge 
spillovers. Equalization of the values of marginal product of labor gives the autarky 
relative price of good 1 to good 2as  pi =  K21  K;  . If  K2  /KIN  <  K2  / K in the initial 
period, North (or South) specializes in good 1 (or 2) with  KIN (or  KZ) and hence the 
output growing at  61 (or  62). If the two goods are good substitutes for households, 
poor. See Temple (1999) for a survey of the mpirical analysis of  the convergence issu . 
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terms-of-trade movement is moderate enough to leave the initial patterns of 
specialization u changed over  time.' Accordingly, the growth rate of South specializing 
in low-tech good does not converge to that of North specializing in high-tech good. In 
this model, the initial conditions determine the patterns of trade and growth which are 
sustained  forever.' 
    Murat and Pigliaru (1998) incorporate international nd intersectoral spillovers 
into Lucas (1988, Sec. 5), and reveal that the presence of international spillovers, if any, 
leads to convergence. Without international nd with intersectoral spillovers, South can 
not catch up with North, since the former produces low-tech but not high-tech good. If 
knowledge spills over from high-tech sector in North to low-tech sector in South, 
however, the growth rate of South necessarily converges to that of  North.' This is 
because technological dvantage in North directly contributes to technological progress 
in  South.' 
    van de  Klundert and Smulders (1996) extend Lucas (1988, Sec. 5) to a three-good 
model to argue that two economies do not necessarily converge, if the degree of 
international spillovers is not so large. Each of two economies N and S can produce 
low-tech good and high-tech good under perfect competition. Low-tech goods of the 
two economies are perfect substitutes while high-tech goods are imperfect substitutes 
for households. Knowledge is augmentable only in the high-tech sector and spills over 
from knowledge-rich North to knowledge-poor South. In South, on the other hand, 
relative productivity gain due to spillovers worsens the terms of trade between high-tech 
20 Suppose that he preference of all households in both economies s identical nd homothetic. Then 
we can construct the world representative household whose preference is given by C1  / C2 = 
where  Ci and a denote world consumption of good j and elasticity of substitution, respectively. 
If a is large, the rate of change in p is small for a given rate of change in  Ci  /C2. 
21 Young (1991) modifies Lucas (1988, Sec. 5) to a model with a continuum of goods and 
intersectoral spillovers, and finds that he difference in the growth rates widens after opening trade. 
 22 Suppose that the accumulation equation in sector 2 in South is given by  k: =  i52YS IpYIN , 
where > 0 represents the degree of international spillovers. Under specialization, this is 
rewritten as  k2  /K2s  =  S  2  +  vic,N  IK2s  .On the other hand, we have  kr  ikr =  61. If and 
only if  KlAr  IK2  <(or  >)(Kr  IK2s)*  =  (61  —  62)Itp  , KiN  IK2 increases (or decreases) 
toward  (Kr  1  K  25.  )*  
23 van Elkan (1996) and Feenstra (1996, Sec. 6.3) also exhibit convergence in the growth rates with 
international spillovers. Invan Elkan (1996), there are two perfectly substitutable types of 
knowledge, original and imitation, and the original knowledge in each economy spills over to 
imitation technology in each other. In Feenstra (1996, Sec. 6.3), R&D knowledge in economy i 
takes the form  Ki =  +z/in`  , where  ni and  n1 denote measure ofthe number of domestic and 
foreign varieties, respectively. Convergence emerges a  long as  1p is positive. 
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goods, and hence,  knowledge.' If the positive spillover effect is dominated by the 
negative terms-of-trade effect, the growth rate of South diverge from that of North. 
    Are knowledge spillovers necessary for convergence? The answer is No. What is 
necessary is that the fruit of knowledge xpansion i  North is distributed to South 
through international transactions. Devereux and Lapham (1994) introduce initial 
difference in knowledge to a completely symmetric two-economy R&D model of 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), and indicate the convergence property even in the 
absence of spillovers. Suppose that the production function of final good in economy i 
 (i  =  N,  S) is given by 
          Yi =(ftxi(j)adj+fxi (f)" df)(4)";aE(0,1), 
- wherelit ,,(j), xz(f), and  L', denote measure of the number of domestic 
varieties, that of foreign, variety  jE[0,ni  ] of intermediate good demanded 
domestically, variety  j'E [0,  ni  ] of intermediate good imported from foreign, and labor 
demand, respectively. Assume that he two economies are completely s mmetric, except 
that North has larger stock of knowledge than South in the initial period:  nN > ns . 
After opening trade in final and intermediate  goods,25 North gets more and more share 
in the world knowledge, and finally all R&D is done by North. However, it does not 
imply that South stops growing. To see this, considering the symmetry among varieties, 
the production functions are rewritten as 
 y  N  =  )a  S  N  r  gyN  )1-a 
 y  S =  oN  (yS  )a  S  (yS  )(ITS  )1-a 
• where a bar over a variable represents that the variable is constant. Both economies 
grow at the rate of growth in  nN  asymptotically.' In spite of no R&D, South tends to 
grow at the same rate as North, because importing increasing varieties of foreign 
24 In Murat and Pigliaru (1998), van Elkan (1996), and Feenstra (1996, Sec. 6.3), knowledge in two 
economies is perfect substitutes, so that he terms-of-trade effect mentioned here is zero. 
25 Homogeneous final goods are not raded ex post, since households with identical preferences have 
no incentive for intertemporal t de. 
26  Vi  iyi  =OinN  inN,  where  ei  nN  r S )a) denotes share of 
varieties produced in North in the index of intermediate goods.  O approaches unity as  nN 
becomes large. 
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 intermediate goods fosters domestic productivity in the same way as doing R&D by 
 itself.' 
 1.5 Technology transfer 
     The previousection tells us that technology transfer from North to South is the 
 engine of convergence. There we assume that technology transfer occurs automatically: 
 knowledge spills over with no cost. In this section, we alternatively suppose that 
 technology is transferred through deliberate conomic activities. For example, 
 technology originated in North is available in South only after Southern entrepreneurs 
 spend resources to imitate Northern products, Northern firms set up overseas 
 subsidiaries in South, and so on. In this context, the major issue is whether the 
 government(s) should regulate the flow of knowledge. Specifically, is it good for growth 
 to protect intellectual property rights  (IPRs)?28 As we can see from the following 
 paragraphs, the answer depends on whether the agents who transfer technology is
 encouraged ordiscouraged by the protection. 
     Making use of the R&D model of their own developing, Grossman and  Helpman 
 (1991c) succeed in endogenizing both innovation and technology transfer by rational 
 agents. They suggest that strengthening IPR protection (i.e., a rise in imitation tax) in 
 South lowers the growth rate. Suppose that North and South are identical, except hat 
 the former specializes in innovation while the latter specializes in imitation.Once 
 innovated, each Northern firm keeps monopoly until a Southern imitator succeeds in 
 reverse-engineering the variety and sells the blueprint o a firm, who wins the entire 
 market for that variety because of lower wage. In contrast o the models with 
 international knowledge spillovers, only each economy's own aggregate knowledge 
 stock contributes to innovation or imitation productivity. Let  n,  nN  , and ns denote 
 measure of the number of varieties innovated so far in North and consumed worldwide, 
 that still produced in North, and that imitated and now produced in South,respectively. 
 Of course,  n =  nN  +ns . In the steady state, all of the three variables grow at a constant 
 rate  y  , and the rate of imitation  ,u  =  ris  I  nN and the share of varieties produced in 
  North  aN  =  nN  In are also constant. 
  27 Feenstra (1996, Sec. 6.1) demonstrates th  partial convergence property with trade in intermediate 
  as well as final goods and without spillovers. 
  28 For practical importance of intellectual property rights, see: 
 http://www.wto.org/wto/intelleciintellec.htm. 
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    When the effective labor (i.e., labor endowment divided by unit labor equirement 
in imitation) in South increases, more labor is employed in the imitation sector, so that 
 ,u rises. Then what happens in North? We first note that here is a positive relationship 
between y and  ,u in the free entry condition for Northern firms, which requires that 
the profit rate for each firm be equal to the risk-adjusted interest  rate.29 A rise in  su  ,
ceteris paribus, raises the profit rate more than the risk-adjusted interest rate. This is 
because the profit base of each surviving Northern firm increases due to the exit of 
some Northern  firms.' A rise in y is needed to restore quilibrium: the profit rate falls 
and the risk-adjusted interest rate rises. Since y  and  y are positively related, y rises 
as a result of an increase in the effective labor in South. Strengthening IPR protection 
has the same effect as a decrease in the effective labor in South by raising the cost of 
    Applying a similar framework to Grossman and Helpman (1991c), Lai (1998) 
argues that tightening IPR protection i  South raises the growth rate, if it is Northern 
multinational corporations (MNCs) rather than Southern imitators that transfer 
technology from North to South. Each Northern firm has two options of production 
location. If it operates domestically, itsmonopoly position is secured by patent laws, but 
it has to endure higher wage. If it goes multinational, it enjoys lower wage, but it faces 
the risk of being imitated by Southern firms. The returns to these two options are 
equalized in equilibrium. On the other hand, Southern firms imitate the MNCs' varieties 
at an exogenous rate, and on succeeding in imitation, they compete inprices to drive out 
the MNCs. Suppose that IPR protection is tightened, that is, the rate of imitation is 
lowered. Then Northern firms have greater incentive to go to South than to stay North, 
so that the rate of technology transfer ises. Since there is complementarity between 
                        1— a LN 1 ap —y " Th
e free ntry condition is given by   —y+p+it, where LN , ap, and  P 
                                a N                       a 
denote labor endowment in North, unit labor equirement in innovation, a d subjective discount rate, 
respectively. Theleft-hand side represents theprofit rate, while the right-hand si e represents the
risk-adjusted interest rate. 
             NAnNs) = 3°We haveCiN=nn(1+  nS  ) In the steady state,  ns  1nN is calculated as 
 ns  inN =ins)(ns inN)= y,y                        /Hence, weget  aN  =  (1  +  au  1  y)-'  =  y  1(y  +  ,u).  This 
implies that a rise in  kt decreases  a  N  .Given n and  XN  =  nN  xN  ,where  XN and  xN 
denote otal output and per-firm output in North, respectively,  nN decreases while xN increases. 
A rise in y has the opposite effects. 
 31 Lai (1995) replaces constant-returns echnology in producing each variety with decreasing-
returns one by adding one specific factor, and implies similar outcomes. Grossman d Helpman 
(1991d) formulate analternative R&D model with rising product quality, and suggest similar results 
when Northern i novators target their effort on only varieties currently produced bySouthern firms. 
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innovation and technology transfer for Northern firms, as in Grossman and Helpman 
(1991c), the rate of innovation also  rises.' 
1.6 Introduction to the following chapters 
    The following two chapters areoriginal contributions tothe literature on the first 
question raised in section 1.1: how does trade policy affect growth and welfare? They 
shed light on why the HPAEs perform better than the other developing economies by 
taking some forms of trade policy. 
    Two facts about rade policy in the HPAEs deserve attention. First, the fastest-
growing economies are far from free trade. Fig. 1.3 plots the average annual growth 
rates of the real per-capita GDP of 41 economies between 1988 and 1992 against he 
logarithmic values of one plus the import-weighted tariff rate in  1988." According to 
this figure, there is no correlation between the growth rate and the tariff rate. If we pick 
out the HPAEs, however, we find the positive correlation between them. Especially, the 
second to the fourth fastest growing economies inthe sample are Korea (8.57%;  1988-
1991), Malaysia (7.45%), and Thailand (7.06%), all of whom imposed tariffs of the rate 
more than 10%. (16.8%, 11.7%, and 35.2%, respectively.) Why did these economies 
grow faster than the other developing economies, both of whom were heavily distorted 
by tariffs? Chapter 2 tries to answer this question. If the government spends the tariff 
revenue for correcting insufficient incentive for capital demand ue to externality, 
imposing tariffs results in higher growth rate and welfare than in free trade. 
    Second, the HPAEs have experienced gradual trade liberalization. The World 
Bank (1993, Chap. 6, Sec. 4) reports the evidence that most governments in the HPAEs 
protected some sectors at first, and thereafter have been reducing the degree of 
protection little by little. Some researchers argue that the success of the HPAEs  are 
                                      1—a LN /(JD  —Y   32  The free entry condition for Northern firms is given by  — P  ; 
                                   a                            aN
aN = y  /(y  +  v)  , where v denotes the rate of technology transfer carried out by MNCs. Note that 
this is the same as the free entry condition in Grossman d Helpman (1991c), except that here the 
risk premium does not directly appear inthe right-hand si e. The risk premium actually appears in 
the no-arbitrage condition between the returns todomestic production a d multinationalization. We 
can derive the positive r lationship between y and  v by the same logic as in Grossman d 
Helpman (1991c). 
33 Source: growth rate: Summers and Heston (1994); tariff rate: Lee and Swagel (1997). Data of 
Taiwan isabsent inthe latter. 
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thanks to their outward-oriented trade policy. Then why were they not outward-oriented 
from the beginning? Why did trade liberalization proceed gradually? Chapter 3 attempts 
to tackle these questions. Sufficient amount of protection in the initial period releases 
the economy from the poverty trap, while sustained growth enables the government to 
reduce the degree of protection gradually. The minimum-protection type of gradual 
trade liberalization is the optimal trade policy from the viewpoint of households.
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Fig. 1.1. Growth of trade and income, 1960-1990 
          (open circle: HPAE)
Growth rate of trade (exports  +  imports) (%)
  Fig. 1.2. Convergence, 1960-1990 
(open circle: HPAE; open triangle: OECD)
Log of real per-capita GDP in 1960
Fig. 1.3. Tariffs and growth,  1988-1992 
       (open circle: HPAE)
Log of (1  +  tariff rate in 1988)
2 Tariff revenue,  government expenditure and 
growth in a small open economy 
2.1 Introduction 
    It is widely known that tariff revenue takes a non-negligible part of government 
revenue in developing economies. According to IMF's Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 1996, more than 20% of the government revenue relies on trade taxes in nearly 
40% of the developing economies. This fact helps us to emphasize that ariffs be seen not 
only as the source of distortion but as the source of government revenue. On the other 
hand, the role of government policy on growth performance has been attracting the 
attention of development economists, and thoroughly analyzed in many types of 
endogenous growth models in recent  years.' It is known that the government should be 
active if and only if the intervention can correct he distortion i herent in the economy. 
    Then how does the government intervention affect growth and welfare in a small 
open economy? Lee (1993) constructs a small-open neoclassical growth model with a 
lump-sum transfer to households as the only direction of government expenditure, and 
claims that any trade intervention can not accelerate growth and improve welfare.2 Osang 
and Pereira (1996) develop a small-open endogenous growth model with physical and 
human capital, and get a welfare implication similar to Lee's under an investment tax 
credit (i.e., subsidy) in addition to the lump-sum transfer. However, their conclusions 
depend on the absence of some domestic distortion. What happens if the tariff revenue is
used for correcting the distortion? Another point to note is that he tariff revenue isjust 
one way of financing the anti-distortionary government expenditure. If the government 
finds another potential source of revenue, it must be compared with the  tariff. Here a 
lump-sum tax will be adopted so that the market economy should attain the Pareto 
optimal allocation. What is the difference between the two financing measures? The 
purpose of this paper is to present a small-open endogenous growth model to answer 
these questions. 
    The model in this paper extends Lee (1993): learning-by-doing effect is 
incorporated in domestic intermediate good sector.3 Including the Marshallian external 
 1 
 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) provide an excellent survey of the field. 
2 Lee (1995) extends Lee (1993) to the Rebelo (1991)-type two-sector framework. 
3 Romer (1986) pioneers an endogenous growth model through learning-by-doing. 
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economies dramatically alters the implications of the model. First, a deviation from free 
trade pushes up the growth rate and improves the welfare, if the tariff revenue isused for 
correcting the domestic distortion. Second, provided that domestic and foreign 
intermediate goods are substitutes, the growth rate with tariff is lower than that with 
lump-sum tax, so is the welfare. 
    The rest of thispaper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the model. 
Section 2.3 analyzes the usual case of tariff with lump-sum transfer, and obtains the free 
trade principle. Section 2.4 deals with the situation i  which the tariff revenue finances the 
anti-distortionary subsidy. Section 2.5 evaluates the growth-maximizing and the optimal 
allocations insection 2.4 in the light of the Pareto-optimal allocation, which is replicated 
by the subsidy financed by the lump-sum tax. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 The model 
    Consider a small open economy which has one final good sector  Y (the 
numeraire) and one intermediate good sector  X  . A number of firms in sector Y have an 
access to identical production function of domestic intermediate good and foreign 
intermediate good  M  . The domestic intermediate good is produced by a number of 
firms with identical production function of capital and effective labor. The effectiveness 
of labor is represented byeconomy-wide capital-labor ratio. The individual firms in sector 
X ignore their own contribution tothe capital-labor ratio, and take it as given. Labor is 
identified with population, and constant. The foreign intermediate good is supplied in a 
perfectly elastic manner at a given price. A number of identical households supply asset as 
loan service to one another, as capital service to firms, and labor service to firms, in 
return for interest, rental, and wage. From the flow of their income, the households 
consume the final good, or accumulate he asset. No international borrowing and lending 
are allowed. 
    In the aggregate, firms in sector X face the production function of the form 
                 X(t) = G(K(t),E(t)L(t)), 
where K,  E, and L denote capital, effectiveness of labor, and labor.4 It is assumed 
that  G(• has positive and diminishing marginal products and exhibits constant returns to 
4 
 Once stated, time variable t is omitted unless it causes some confusion. 
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scale. Dividing both sides by  L, the production function is expressed in per-capita form: 
                     x=G(k,E);x.---X IL,k  -K  /L. 
The effectiveness of labor is given by5 
 E(t)  =  k(t). (2.1) 
Let  px(t),  R(t), and w(t) denote price of  X  , rental, and wage, respectively. The 
firms maximize their profits, given  px,  R, w, and  E. The first-order conditions 
(FOCs) are 
 R=  pxGi(k,E), (2.2) 
                 w =  px(G(k,E)—kGi(k,E)), (2.3) 
where a subscript number represents differentiation with respect to the  number`h 
argument. The right-hand sides of (2.2) and (2.3) express  VMPK and  VMPL  , values of 
marginal product of capital and labor, respectively. 
    Firms in sector Y are subjecttothe following production function: 
                  Y(t) =  F(X(t),M(t)), 
where  FO has positive and diminishing marginal products and exhibits constant returns 
to scale. Dividing both sides by  X  , we have 
 Y  /X  =  F(1,  M  /X) 
 f(q);q-=MIX. 
q is interpreted as relative intensity of foreign intermediate good to domestic one. With 
 pm (t) denoting price of  M, the firms maximize their profits, given  px and  pm. The 
FOCs are 
5 Alternatively,  E(t)  =  K(t) is possible. Although t is specification will yield qualitatively the same 
results, it causes the economy with larger population t  enjoy higher growth rate. The specification 
such as (2.1) avoids this kind of scale ffect. 
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 P  x =  f  (q) -  of  "(0, (2.4) 
              PM =f  '(q). (2.5) 
The right-hand sides of (2.4) and (2.5) express  VMPx and  VMPm  , values of marginal 
product of domestic intermediate good and foreign i termediate good, respectively. 
    The budget constraint of households in the aggregate is given by
               A(t) =  r(t)A(t)  +w(t)L —  C  (t) + T (t), 
where A,  r,  C, and T denote stock of asset, interest on loans, consumption, a d 
lump-sum transfer from the government ( egative T refers to lump-sum tax), and a dot 
over a variable r presents differentiation with respect to  t  . Its per-capita form is 
 a  =  ra+w—c+TIL;aa.AIL,ca.CIL. (2.6) 
The utility of the representative household is defined as 
              U =  CP'  (c(t)1-6  —1)1(1—0)dt; p >0,6> 0,Jo  
where p and 0 denote subjective discount rate and elasticity of marginal utility, 
respectively. In the present case with no uncertainty, 0 is just the inverse of elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution. The households maximize the utility, subject to (2.6), given 
 a(0)  , {r(t)}:0  , and  {w(t)}7_0  . The usual Hamiltonian method yields 
 c(t)-6  —v(t)  = 0, (2.7) 
 v(t)r(t)  =  4(t), (2.8) 
where  it denotes value of a unit of final good measured in terms of utility at t =  0  , as 
the FOCs, and 
 lim  v(I)a(I) = 0, (2.9) 
as the transversality condition. The Euler equation isderived from (2.7) and (2.8) as 
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 401  c(t)=(110)(r(t)— p). (2.10) 
    The asset market is described as follows. There are two perfectly substitutable 
assets, the claim of loans and the ownership of capital. The no-arbitrage condition 
between the two assets is6 
 r  =  R. (2.11) 
Since the two assets are perfect substitutes, the demand for them can be simply summed. 
From the fact that the aggregate net demand for loans is zero in equilibrium, the asset 
market clearing condition must be given by 
 A  =  K. (2.12) 
2.3 Regime 1: import tariff with lump-sum transfer 
    Consider first he case of free trade as a benchmark. Suppose that  pjf =1, where 
the superscript f stands for "free  trade."' From (2.5), q in free trade isgiven by 
 q=  f  '  -1  (1)  -=  q  f  .
Substituting thisinto (2.4),  px in free trade isexpressed as 
                 Px = f(e)--qf r(e)--= Pl-
    Suppose next that the government imposes an ad-valorem tariff of the rate  r  , and 
redistributes the tariff revenue to households in a lump-sum fashion. It is assumed 
throughout that r is given in the initial period, and can not be changed thereafter. Then 
the domestic price of M is given by  pm  =1+-r. Throughout this paper, suppose that 
r  z  0. Assuming balanced budget in every period, the government's budget constraint is 
6 We assume that capital does not depreciate at all. This will not alter the qualitative results. 
 This normalization is done only for simplicity. The following results will not be essentially changed 
as long as any arbitrary constant is set for the free-trade import price. 
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 T  =  -dt1 (2.13) 
From (2.5), q in general is given by 
 q=  f  -1  (1+  r)  q(r);  q'  =1.1  f <  O. 
Then from (2.4),  px in general is expressed  as8 
 p =  f  (q(r))  —  q(r)f  (q(r))  =  yo(r);co(0) =  p  If(  = —q  <  0,T" = —q' > 0. 
For  px to be positive, it is assumed that 
 T(r)  >  O. (2.14) 
Substituting the above xpression for  px into (2.2), and considering (2.1), we get 
                    R =  131T(r);.131  =  G1(1,1)• (2.15)
The kind of equation such as (2.15) is named the VMPK equation, and is often mentioned 
in the rest of this paper. It is easily seen that R monotonically falls with  r  . See Fig. 2.1 
through Fig. 2.3. A rise in r reduces the employment of M in Fig. 2.1, shifting the 
negatively-sloped  VMPx schedule down in Fig. 2.2. With the supply of X unchanged,9 
it brings  px down. In Fig. 2.3, the negatively-sloped rivate  VMPK schedule islowered 
proportionately with  p  , causing R to go down. w is calculated inthe same manner 
as  (2.15):10 
 W =  B  2co(r)k;B  2  a  G2  (1,1). 
    It is time to find the equilibrium path. The resource constraint isderived from (2.6), 
8 In deriving that =  —q, we have used the fact hat q'  =11  f . 
9 
 Look first at Fig. 2.3. For any  p , the equilibrium quantity of demand for K is equal to the fixed 
quantity of supply. Since X is linear in  K, the supply schedule of X is vertical against the X  -
axis in Fig. 2.2. 
to  Euler'  s formula is applied in deriving this expression. 
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(2.11), (2.12), (2.13), and the expressions for R and  w, as 
             k  =  B  (yo(r)  —  TO-0)k —  c;  B  = G(1,1) =B1 + B2. (2.16) 
The growth rate of consumption s derived from (2.10), (2.11), and (2.15) as 
 e/  c =  (1/9)(B1T(r) — p). (2.17) 
Given  r  , (2.16) and (2.17) fully describe the dynamic behavior f the economy. It 
follows that k also grows at the constant rate  a  c from the initial period to the  infinite 
horizon, implying that he economy is always in the steady  state.11 From the production 
function of X and the fact that  plc is constant, gross domestic product (GDP)  px  X  12 
must also grow at the same rate. So let  y  (r) denote the common steady-state growth 
rate. Throughout this paper, a superscript number represents the regime the economy isin. 
Differentiating (2.17) with respect to  r  , we have 
                           = Bicp'10 <0.
This says that increasing the tariff rate monotonically owers the growth rate. Here the 
only effect of the tariff on the growth rate is the  distortionary effect. 
    Once it is known that he free trade policy  maximizesthe growth rate, it has  to  be 
checked whether it also maximizes the welfare. Noting that c(t) grows at a constant rate 
 y  , the utility of the representative household isrewritten as 
                  1 c(0)"  1 
                      U =                                             --
                      1-0  p  —  y  (1—  0) p 
It is assumed that 
               p >  y  (1—  0), (2.18) 
11 This is a typical feature of the AK models with only one state variable: the transversality condition 
excludes any transitional dynamics. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, pp. 142-143) for rigorous 
 proof. 
 12  The value of total output is  Y +  p
x X . However, all the value of the final good is paid to 
foreigners and firms in sector X . Therefore, the GDP is  px  X  . 
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in order to exclude unbounded utility. For 0 =1, applying l'Hopital's rule yields 
                 U =  (1/  p)(y  p  +  In  c(0)). 
From (2.16) and the fact that  ic/k =  y  1(r)  , the consumption function in the initial period 
is given by 
 c1(0)  =  [B(yo(r)—rTV))—  yl(z)]k(0). 
Substituting this into the utility function and  differentiating it with respect to  r  , we get 
          = —Bryolp — y1(1— 0)]— yvi[p — y1(1— 0)]+ y,1[B(co y1]; 
 [p  —  y1  (1  —  0)]2  c(0)61  k  (0)-1  . 
In the right-hand si e of this expression, the first erm reflects the income-reducing effect 
of the tariff, meaning that he flow of income belonging to the economy decreases 
through t e decrease in  q  .On the other hand, the second and the third terms indicate the 
indirect and the direct effects ofthe change in  y1  , respectively: a rise in the growth rate 
indirectly lowers the welfare through t e decrease in the initial consumption, while it 
directly raises the welfare by increasing the future consumption. Combining the last wo 
terms and using (2.17), we have 
              A"U„.1  =—Br(plp  —  y1(1—  0)]+  y.,1(B2co  —  Brca'). 
This implies that  U,' is globally negative, since  yz is globally negative. In other words, 
increasing the tariff rate monotonically owers the welfare. 
    To sum up, 
Proposition 2.1. In Regime 1, free trade is both  growth-maximizing a d optimal. 
2.4 Regime 2: import tariff with capital subsidy 
    Suppose that the government sets an ad-valorem subsidy of the rate s E [0,1) to 
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the employment of capital service, which is financed by the tariff.13 Then (2.15) is 
 modified to 
                       (1— s)R =  Blco(r). 
The government's budget constraint is
 sRK  =  rM. (2.19) 
Taking account of (2.19), the  VMPK is expressed as
                  R  =131co(r)—B-tvi(r). (2.20) 
Using (2.20) and the calculated expression for  w  , the resource constraint and the growth 
rate are respectively given by 
                 k =  B(co(T)-14/(0)k  —  c, (2.21) 
 Y 2 (r)  (09)0199(0 - 13-COC) p). (2.22) 
Note that he resource constraint in Regime 2 (2.21) is the same as that in Regime 1 - 
(2.16). It is easy to verify that in free trade (2.21) and (2.22) yield the same allocation as 
the growth-maximizing and the optimal one in Regime 1. 
    First, let us explore the growth-maximizing tariffrate. Differentiating (2.22) with 
respect to  r  , we have 
                     yt = (BIT' —BT' —ffrcoll)149. 
The first term in the right-hand side reflects the distortionary effect, which was also 
present in Regime 1. The second and the third terms indicate the productivity effects of 
the subsidy financed by the  tariff. The second term, which we call the productivity-
enhancing effect, is positive due to the increase in the tariff revenue for given q, while 
the third term, the productivity-reducing effect, is negative because the tariff revenue 
decreases as a result of the fall in  q. Note that the productivity-enhancing effect 
13  sis assumed to be permanent as well as  r  . 
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outweighs the distortionary effect. This is because the social marginal product of capital 
B is larger than the private marginal product of capital B1. 
    Evaluating  y,2 at r =  0  , the second-order p oductivity-reducing effect vanishes, 
so that  y,2 (0) >  0  . In other words, a small deviation from free trade raises the growth 
rate. On the other hand, the FOC of maximization f y  2  (r) is 
                                  r,2               (r) = 0. (2.23) 
Assume that the solution to (2.23) exists and is unique. This can be analytically proved 
when  GO is of the Cobb-Douglas form and  F(•) is of the CES form, as specified later 
in this section. See Appendix 2A for proof. Let  z2 denote the solution. 
Proposition 2.2. In Regime 2, the growth-maximizing tariff rate is positive. 
    The next thing to consider is what is the optimal tariff rate. In the same way as in 
Regime 1, the welfare ffect is decomposed into 
     A2u2 = _BrTIf[p y 2 (1 0)] —y2 (1 6)] yr2[B(co rcof) 7,2]; 
 A2 _m [p2 (1)]0,-.2 c(0)6 k(0)-1. 
Using (2.22), this is calculated as 
 A2ur2,  = —Brcolp  —  y  2  (1.  —  0)]  + 
    Evaluating this at r =  0, the first term in the right-hand side, the income-reducing 
effect, disappears, so that he sign of  U, (0) corresponds with that of  y,2(0)  , which is 
positive. This says that a small deviation from free trade improves the welfare. On the 
other hand, for r  z  f2, the second term is negative as well as the first term. Therefore, 
the optimal tariff rate r 2* lies strictly between zero and 
Proposition 2.3. In Regime 2, the optimal tariff rate is positive and lower than the 
growth-maximizing tariff rate. 
    Proposition 2.3 says that growth and welfare are rival policy objectives. This is 
because of the income-reducing effect: the tariff affects the welfare not only through the 
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growth rate but also through the flow of income. Barro (1990, Sec. 1) gives an 
endogenous growth model inwhich revenue from a proportional i come tax is spent for 
publicly provided production services, and proves that he growth-maximizing tax rate is 
also ptimal when production fu ction is of the Cobb-Douglas form. Our proposition s i
contrast to Barro's equivalence result, even ifthe production fu ctions are of the Cobb-
Douglas  form.14 
    Finally, let us make some numerical examples so as to grasp aconcrete image of 
the model. Following Lee (1993), let 
               X = G(K,EL)=BK"  (EL)i-a  ;aE (0,1), (2.24) 
 Y =  F  (X  ,M)  =  [(1—  )m)X('"  +A.MM(a-1)1ara-i);~,ME  (0,1), a >  0,(2.25) 
where a denotes elasticity of substitution between X and  M  . For a =1, applying 
 1'Hopital's rule yields 
 Y  =  F  (X  ,M)  =  m  M  Am  . 
Under these specifications,  px is given by 
 Px =  =  Aw  ra-1)  _  Ama  (1+  T)i-cr  [1/(1-a). 
(2.14), the condition for positive  px  , is equivalent to 
 1—  AM (1  + > 0. (2.26) 
(2.23), the FOC of maximization of  y 2  (T)  , is equivalent to 
 (r)  =  0;  (r)  a  (1  —  a)(1+  Amc  (1+  2)1-  -  ar (2.27) 
 14  Barro (1990, Sec. 5) presents a counterexample by himself in asetting where the government 
provides notonly production but also consumption services. The reason for the non-equivalence 
outcome is easy to understand: there are two independent policy variables, tax rates for production and 
consumption services, and the government takes the latter as given when it maximizes th  growth rate. 
Contrary to this, our model makes the non-equivalence result even if it has only one independent 
policy variable as well as Barro (1990, Sec. 1). 
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The following figures are drawn with B =  0.5  , a =  0.5,  AM =  0.5  , p = 0.01, 6  =1 
(log utility), and k(0) =  e  . Fig. 2.4a and Fig. 2.4b display the dependence of the growth 
rate and the welfare, respectively, onthe tariff rate with a =  2. Fig.  2.5a and Fig. 2.5b 
do with a  =1, and Fig. 2.6a and Fig. 2.6b with a =  0.5  . All of these figures are 
consistent with the analytical results developed earlier. Several points hould be especially 
noted. First, the higher a is, the flatter the curves are. This is because the economy 
adjusts to changes in the tariff rate easily when it has high substitutability. Second,  i2 is 
not monotonic with  a. Direct calculations from (2.27) reveal that it is 1/4 = 25% when 
a =  2, 1/3  = 33% when a =1, and  21/3 —1  = 26% when a =  0.5  . To see why, 
applying implicit function theorem in (2.27), we have  
-  I  da  
p  (,).0  =  a  lip  ';ip  =  -(1-  a)(1+  -t-)Ama  +  [th.  Am  _  ln(1  +  -c)]  --c. 
Since  <  0 because of the fact that tp(0) > 0 and that  z2 is unique, the sign of 
the left-hand side corresponds with that of  ip  a, which is ambiguous. Third, Proposition 
2.3 is surely supported by the examples. It is estimated that  1-2* is about 21% when 
a =  2  , about 26% when a =1, and about 20% when a =  0.5  , each of which is lower 
than 
2.5 Evaluating Regime 2 
    To identify the Pareto ptimal allocation, suppose first that he government directly 
allocates the economy's resources to maximize the utility of the representative household. 
From the expenditure side, the national account of the final good is given by 
                 Y(t) = C(t) + k(t) + Z (t), 
where Z denotes export. Note that the foreign good can neither be consumed nor 
invested. Since international borrowing and lending are not allowed, the current account 
must be zero, that is, 
                               Z  =M. 
From these and (2.1), the resource constraint isderived as 
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 k  =  (f  (q)  —  q)Bk  —  c. (2.28) 
Note that (2.28) applies to any  regime.15 
    The problem is to maximize the utility, subject to (2.28), given  k(0)  . Set up the 
present-value Hamiltonian as 
        J  =  e-Pt(c(t)i-e—1)1(1—  0) +  ri(t)[(f  (q(t)) — q(t))Bk(t) — c(t)], 
where  n denotes present-value shadow price of a unit of final good. The FOCs are 
                 J c=  c(t)-9  —r 1(0 = 0, (2.29) 
 Jq =  ri(t)(f  (q(t))  —1)Bk(t) = 0, (2.30) 
                .1k =  n(0(  f (q(t))— q(t))B =  41(0. (2.31) 
The transversality condition is 
 lim  „co  (t  )k(i)  =  0. (2.32) 
    Let us find the solution. Note that (2.30) yields q =  q  f  ,and 
 f(gf)_gfr(qf)  =  P. 
Then from (2.29) and (2.31), we get 
 y" =  (11  0)(Bp; —  p), 
15 
 (2.16) and (2.21), the resource onstraints in Regime 1and Regime 2, respectively, can be derived 
from the expenditure-side national ccount, the balanced current account, and the following 
distribution-side national ccount: 
 Y  (t) =  p  x  (t)X  (t) +  PM  (t)M  (t) 
               =  R(t)K(t) + w(t)L +  (1+ r)M (t).
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where the superscript so stands for "social optimum." Consumption in the initial period 
is calculated as 
 cso  (0) =  (Bpic  —  yso)k(0). 
Since the instantaneous utility function is strictly concave, the Pareto optimal 
consumption allocation  {c" (t)}7  0is unique. 
    Next, suppose that the government sets the capital subsidy which is financed by a 
lump-sum tax imposed on households. Let us call this policy environment Regime 3. With 
the subsidy and no  tariff, the VMPK equation is given by 
 R=  [1/(1  —  s)]Blp;. (2.33) 
The government's budget constraint is 
             sRK = —T. (2.34) 
Then the economy's re ource onstraint a d the growth rate are respectively given by 
 k=Bpfk-c, (2.35) 
 y  3  (S) =  0)1[141  -  s)]./31p1  —  pl. (2.36) 
    If the government sets the subsidy rate as 
                          s =1—Bs3*,        1(2.37) 
then (2.35) and (2.36) give 
 r  3  (S3*  =  (11°)(B14  —P)=y"• 
Since the resource constraints and the growth rates are the same, with (2.37) the 
economy attains the Pareto optimal llocation in Regime 3. 
     Now it is time to consider whether the maximum welfare or the maximum growth 
rate in Regime 2 is lower than the maximum welfare orthe optimal growth rate in Regime 
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3. First, comparing the levels of the optimal initial consumption, we have 
 c2*  (0) =  [B(co(i.  2*  ) T24,99/(7_2*  ))  y  2(T  2*  )]k(0) 
 #  (Bp  —  y3  (s3*  ))k(0) =  C3*  (0), 
which is sufficient to say that the maximum welfare in Regime 2 is lower than that in 
Regime 3. Second, comparing the VMPK 's, we can not tell if the maximum growth rate 
is in general lower than the optimal one in Regime 3. By specifying functional forms, 
however, we can say more. 
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that the production functions are specified as (2.24) and 
(2.25). The maximum growth rate in Regime 2 is lower than the optimal growth rate in 
 Regime  3,  if  o-
Proof See Appendix 2B. 
    If the elasticity of substitution is high in Regime 2, q decreases drastically as the 
tariff rate rises. Then the amount of the subsidy must be kept low according to the 
government's budget constraint. In our terms, the productivity-reducing effect is large 
relative to the net effect of the productivity-enhancing and the distortionary effects. Thus, 
even the maximum growth rate is not so different from that in free trade. This 
interpretation is graphically confirmed by Fig. 2.4a. 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
    This paper hasinvestigated policy effects on growth and welfare of a small open 
economy with domestic distortion. In Regime 1, where tariff revenue is transferred to
households, free trade is both growth-maximizing and optimal. In Regime 2, where the 
tariff revenue isused for correcting the domestic distortion, free trade is neither growth-
maximizing nor optimal. Furthermore, the optimal tariff rate is lower than the growth-
maximizing one. In Regime 3, where the anti-distortionary government expenditure is 
financed by a lump-sum tax, the economy can reach the Pareto optimal allocation. 
Regime 2is dominated by Regime 3with respect to both growth and welfare, if domestic 
and foreign intermediate goods are substitutes. 
    These results have some policy implications. First, spending policy of the 
                          33
government is crucial in determining the success of the trade intervention. This view may 
help explain the difference between the East Asian economies and the other developing 
economies. Second, even if the trade intervention works in offsetting the domestic 
distortion, it must be remembered that there is a better revenue source than the  tariff. As 
the economy develops, the government should seek for less distortionary revenue 
structure for the sake of households.
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Appendix 2A Proof of the existence and the uniqueness of the solution to (2.23) 
in a specified case 
When the production fu ctions are specified as (2.24) and (2.25), (2.23) isequivalent to 
 (r)  =  0;zp  (r)  (1  -  a)(1  +  r)[1.  - +-ry-a]  -  ar. (2.27) 
 zp  (r) is continuous in  r  , and 
 zp  (0)  =  (1-  a)(1-  )  >  0. 
If 
             zp(f) < 0, (2A.1) 
then from the intermediate value theorem, there exists  r E  (0,f) such that it satisfy 
(2.27). Therefore, what has to be shown is that (2A.1) holds somewhere at  i  . 
    If  a  z  1,  we  have  with  z  =  00, 
 lim  „  (r)  =  lim  ,  {(1  -  -  Ama                              ) j+{(1- a)[1.- AL (1 + r)1-7]-crlr 
 =  1-  a  +  (1-  a  -  o-)00  <  0, 
since 1- a - a  <  0 in this case. However, if 0  <  a  <  1, the above calculation is ot valid. 
Then (2.26) gives 
                                    T<Amal(a-1) — -m*- 
 lim  (r)  =  -a(A,V(a4)  -1)  <  0. 
    Next, let us consider the uniqueness. Noting that Ip(r) is continuous in r and 
that  zp(0) > 0, the solution to(2.27) nearest to zero satisfies 
 zp'(r)  O. (2A.2) 
Then if there were multiple solutions, there must exist  i  E  (0,i) such that it satisfy 
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(2.27) and 
                        7p1(i) z O. 
it is proved that any solution to (2.27) must satisfy (2A.2) with strict inequality, so that 
-- 
T can not exist. 
    The first derivative of V(T) is calculated as
 p'(z) =  (1  —  a)[1.  —  (1+  T)'-a  ]  —  (1  —  a)(1  —  a)AL  (1  +  T)1-a  — (2A.3) 
If a  a  , further calculation f (2A.3) gives 
 Ip'(r)=  (1-  a  -  cr)[1-  Al-  (1  +  T)l-a  ]  —  [1  —  a(1—  a)]Afm  (1+  <0, 
since  1— a  (1— a)  1—  a  2 >  0  . Note that his holds globally. But what if a  <1—a  ?
Rewriting (2.27), we have 
 (1  —  a)[1_  —  (1  +  T)i-a  ]=  /(1+  T). (2A.4) 
Substituting this into (2A.3), we get 
 '(T) =  a[-1/(1+  T)] —  (1—  a)(1—  a)Xlm (1 +  z)1-a  <  0, 
since  1—  6 > a >  0  . In any case, any solution to (2.27) satisfies (2A.2) with strict 
inequality. Q.E.D. 
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Appendix 2B Proof of Proposition 2.4 
    When a  y  2  (i"  2)  <  y  3  (S3*) isequivalent  to 
    — A.ma(1+i-2)'-a ri-co {a +-1-24 (1+ i2)-a — Ama +<(1—)"(1--). 
Rewriting (2.27) gives 
 f2Ama  +  Amc,  +.e2)1._cir =  -  a  /0.)(1+.e2)1-,. 
Substituting this into the left-hand side of the above inequality, and rearranging terms, we 
get 
 [1  - (1+  2  )1-a  r-a)  {a  +Z  2A  (1+  2)-11  - +  2)1-a  V}
 =  [1_  Ama  +  2  )1-cr  ]l/(1-cr)ra  (1-  a  )(AL  /o-)(1+  i=2)1-'1 
        < (1- 4)1°— cr)  a  >1. 
    When a  =1,  y  2  (i2) < y  3  (S3*  ) isequivalent to 
 (1+  om-D[or  -FeAm(1A--e2)-1(1-4,)-1 <1. 
Using (2.27), the left-hand si e becomes 
 -e2)Am  P -Dia  -F-e2Am(1+i-2)-1(i_  Am)-l] 
             =  +  kAm-D[a  +  (1  -  a)Am  ] <1. 
                                                                             Q.E.D. 
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3 A rationale for infant industry protection and 
gradual trade liberalization 
3.1 Introduction 
    The East Asian economies have been praised for their remarkable growth 
performance since 1980's, although they struggle for the recessions beginning in 1997. 
Some developing economists attribute their success to their outward-oriented trade 
policies. In fact, all the governments in this area have been liberalizing foreign 
transactions step by step. However, it is important to note that all the East Asian 
economies except Hong Kong had implemented some forms of trade protection before 
the gradual trade liberalization took place.' Why did they protect some sectors initially? 
Why do they reduce the degree of protection gradually, rather than suddenly or not at all? 
The purpose of this paper is to give a theoretical framework so as to answer these 
questions. 
    This paper  will show that the optimal path of trade policy is an element of gradual 
trade liberalization i  the context of the infant industry argument.2 Since protection ofthe 
infant industry is carried out temporarily and selectively, it is suitable to build a dynamic 
general equilibrium odel. Bardhan (1971) constructs a two-final-good, two-factor, 
small-open model in which cumulated output of a sector contributes to productivity of 
only the sector itself in a non-appropriable way. He shows that the optimal rate of 
protection decreases gradually and takes a positive value in the steady state.3 Fung and 
Ishikawa (1992) present a two-final-good, two-factor, small-open endogenous growth 
model which incorporates variety expansion due to R&D in intermediate good sector. 
They show that imposing aproduction tax on the traditional sector for some time and 
removing it immediately make the otherwise zero-growth economy take  off. The main 
contribution i this paper is to find out that a particular path of gradual trade liberalization 
followed by free trade is optimal. 
    We construct asmall-open endogenous growth model based on R&D. There are 
two final goods, each of which is produced from labor and a variety of intermediate 
1 World Bank (1993) provides historical and institutional perspectives on the East Asian growth. 
2 Corden (1974) gives aclassic review of the infant industry argument. 
3 
 Succar (1987) generalizes Bardhan (1971) by assuming that cumulative output of a sector raises 
productivity of both sectors, and obtains imilar elults. 
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goods. In intermediate good sector, each variety is made out of labor alone. R&D means 
that a potential firm pays a fixed cost to create anew variety and enter the intermediate 
good sector. The framework resembles the two-final-good, two-primary-factor, small-
open models of Fung and Ishikawa (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chap. 6), 
and the one-final-good, one-primary-factor, closed-economy model of Ciccone and 
Matsuyama (1996, Sec. 7). 
    Let us see how themodel works. The small open economy completely specializes 
in only one of the two final goods, labor-intensive one (called good 1) and intermediate-
good-intensive one (good 2). This is because constant returns to scale prevails in each 
sector in each period, and the number of final goods is larger than that of primary factors. 
The larger is the number of varieties of intermediate goods available in the period, the 
lower relative cost of good 2 to good 1, and the more likely the economy specializes in
the former, given domestic prices. This is easily understood by thinking that relative price 
of intermediate goods as a whole to labor goes down as the number of varieties increases. 
As for dynamics, the growth rate in the steady state with specialization in good 2 is 
always higher than that with specialization in good 1, because of profit and resource 
effects: good-2 firms pay more to intermediate goods than  good-1 firms, and then the 
profit rate is higher; good-2 firms use less labor directly than  good-1 firms, and so the 
total labor coefficient is smaller, which makes more room for R&D. If parameters are 
such that the former growth rate is positive and the latter is zero, and if the initial number 
of varieties i  so small that he economy specializes in good 1 in free trade, the economy 
falls into the poverty trap, that is, it can not grow forever although itcan if it specializes in 
good 2. In this model, history (i.e., initial number of varieties) together with an external 
environment (i.e., world prices) determines one equilibrium out of the two.4 
    Because of the Ricardian feature with only two steady states,it is very easy to 
analyze the effect of trade policy in the trapped economy specializing in good 1 in free 
trade. Initially, distort he price of good 2 upward so that the economy specialize inthe 
 good. Then the number of varieties tarts to  grow, with the relative cost of  good 2 
declining faster than the world relative price of good 2. This enables the government to
reduce the degree of  protection gradually and remove it finally. Moreover, considering 
the welfare of the representative household, less protection is better. Therefore, the 
optimal trade policy is gradual trade liberalization with the rate of protection kept to a 
minimum for specialization i good 2. 
4 In the literature on multiple quilibria, either history or expectation determines the equilibrium. See 
Krugman (1991). 
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    The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 formulates the basic 
model. Section 3.3 analyzes the small open economy, and shows that under some 
conditions there exists the poverty trap characterized by zero growth in free trade. 
Section 3.4 discusses trade policy for escaping from the poverty trap. Section 3.5 
concludes. 
3.2 The model 
    Consider asmall open economy with two tradable final good sectors and one non-
tradable intermediate good sector.5 It is assumed that all economic agents have perfect 
foresight. In the final good sector j  ( j =1,2), firms are subject o the following 
production function. 
 Vi (t) =  F1  (Xi  (t),  Li (t)) =  BiXi  (0")  Li  (01-c5  ;  a j E (0,1), 
           X(t) = G ({Xt)}in_(0t))  =(t)Xt)(a-of 0di)a /(cr-1);0-  >1,
where  Yj,  Xj,  Lj,  aj,  xj(i),  n, and a denote output, index of intermediate 
goods employed, labor employed, factor share of  Xi  , variety  iE[0,n] of intermediate 
good employed, measure ofthe number of varieties of intermediate goods (assumed tobe 
continuous), and elasticity of substitution between any two varieties,  respectively.° 
Suppose that  al  <a2, that is, firms in sector 2 pay more to intermediate goods than 
those in sector 1, implying that good 2 is intermediate-good-intensive whil  good 1 is 
labor-intensive. Cost minimization subject to the  specified technology given input prices 
implies that 
               Px ({Pxo}n_00 0(t),x0,doi.41-a)(3.1) 
 c  (Pa,  (t),  w(t)) =  Pic  w(t)1-a' (3.2) 
5 Non-tradability ofthe intermediate goods i  assumed in order to focus on one route from which trade 
affects growth. Fung and Ishikawa (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chap. 6), among others, 
follow this assumption. Rodrik (1996) gives ome interpretations f it. 
 6 
 Once stated, time variable t is omitted unless it causes some confusion. 
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where  Px  ,  p  x  (1)  , c  , and w denote price index associated with  Xi  , price of variety 
 i  , unit cost in producing  Yi  , and wage, respectively. Let  p3 (t) denote domestic price of 
good  j  . Because of perfect competition, good j is produced according to the 
following condition. 
 pi  ci  (Px  ,  w),Y  0,Y  i  (pi  —  ci  (Px  ,  w))  =  O. (3.3) 
    After getting apatent for its own invention, each firm exclusively producingvariety 
i of intermediate good maximizes its  profit,' given the action of the other firms of 
differentiated varieties, the quantity of final goods produced, and wage. Calculating the 
derived emand from (3.1) and (3.2), and noting that each firm is in almost zero measure 
in the intermediate good sector, the own price elasticity of demand equals  a  . Then the 
first-order condition of profit maximization is given by  p  x  (i)(1-1  I  a) =  wax  , where  ax 
denotes unit labor requirement i  producing  x(i), which is assumed to be common to 
any firm  i  . For simplicity, let us choose the unit of measurement so that  ax  =  1-1/a  . 
Then the above pricing formula becomes 
             Px(i) = w. (3.4) 
From (3.4) and the form of  Xi =  GO,  px(i) and x(i) are the same among varieties, 
so i is omitted unless ome confusion arises. Then from (3.1) and (3.4), we have 
                px =  wn  1/(1-a) (3.5) 
This implies that the larger n is, the lower  Px is for given  w  . In other words, an 
increase in the number of varieties makes intermediate goods as a whole relatively 
cheaper than labor. The representative firm's gross profit  z(t) is defined as 
x(t) =  px(t)x(t) —  w(t)axx(t) =  px(t)x(t)/a  , and its firm value v(t) is expressed as 
v(t)  =f exp(  f  r(s)ds).7  t(r)dr  , where r denotes interest ateon loans. 
    Potential firms  can participate in the intermediate good sector after investing in 
creating anew variety. The fixed cost measured in terms of labor takes the form  a  „  I  n(t)  , 
 7  Here maximization ofprofit in each period is equivalent to maximization of firm value
, since the 
firm does not have any state variable which is subject o adjustment cost. 
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where  a„ is a positive constant. The fixed cost decreases with  n(t), which represents 
the aggregate stock of knowledge inperiod  t  . However, the predecessors' contribution 
to the technological improvement is not compensated. Comparing benefit of entry with 
cost, the potential entrants decide whether to enter. The free entry condition is given by 
         v(t)  s  w(t)a„  n(t),ri(t)  0,ri(t)(v(t)—  w(t)a„  I n(0) = 0, (3.6) 
where a dot over a variable represents differentiation with respect to  t  . 
    The representative household maximizes the discounted sum of log utility 
U =  fre-P`lnC(Odt, where p denotes subjective d scount rate, and the index of
instantaneous consumption C(t) =  u(C1(t),C2(t)) is assumed to be increasing, concave, 
and differentiable. The dynamic budget constraint is
      A(t) =  r(t)A(t)  + w(t)L  +T  (t)  —  E(t);  E(t) =  p1(t)C1(t)+  p2  (t)C2  (t), (3.7) 
where  A,  L,  T, and E denote asset, endowment of labor, lump-sum transfer, and 
value of expenditure, respectively. Dynamic optimization yields the  transversality 
condition and the following Euler equation: 
 YE (t) =  r(t)  — p, (3.8) 
where  y, denotes growth rate of the subscript. 
    Let us consider the equilibrium conditions. The intermediate good market 
i  E[0, n] clear if x(i) = +  x2(i), and the labor market clearing condition is 
                 L  =  L1  +  L2  +  nax(xl  +  x2)+  (a„  I  n)ri. (3.9)
In the asset market, wo perfectly substitutable assets, the claim of loans and the share of 
stocks, are traded only domestically. Differentiating the defining equation of  v  , the no-
arbitrage condition isexpressed as
 r  =  (yr  +  V)!  v. (3.10) 
With the asset market clearing condition A =  nv,  , we complete the description of the 
model. 
    To derive the key dynamic equations, let z  = E  /(nv) denote ratio of expenditure 
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to aggregate firm value. Because of the asset market clearing condition, it can be 
interpreted as marginal and average propensity to expend out of asset. Noting that 
 ai=npxxi  /(p3Y3) and  1  —aj  =wLjl(pil'i), the resource constraint (3.9) is combined 
with (3.4) and (3.6) to yield 
        y„  =  maxILI a„  —[(1—  al /  a)piYi  I  E  +  (1—  a2  /a)p2Y2  /Elz,01. (3.11) 
Using the expression for  a-, the intermediate good market clearing condition, and (3.10), 
the Euler equation (3.8) is transformed into 
              yz =  (1/a)(a1pyi/E + a2p2Y2  I E)z—  y„ — p. (3.12) 
3.3 Small open economy 
    We are concerned with a small open economy, which takes the time path of terms 
of trade as given. Originating in Grossman and Helpman (1991), there has been a lot of 
literature on open endogenous growth models, of which multi-economy odels account 
for a larger part than small-economy ones.8 The small-open assumption is adopted for 
both practical and theoretical reasons: we are interested in growth in a developing 
economy which can be regarded as small relative to the world; the pure growth-enhancing 
effect of protection must be examined separately from the beggar-thy-neighbor terms-of-
trade ffect and the resulting strategic aspect. 
    Let  pi (t) denote world price of good  j  .Noting that  Walras' law holds in the 
economy,9 let good 2 be the numeraire:  p2  (t)=1Vt  . The small-open assumption means 
that  1pf.  Or  0 is exogenous, b t may not necessarily be constant. Suppose that the 
government imposes (or gives) an ad-valorem import tariff (or export subsidy) of the rate 
 6  (t) on (or to) good  j  ,and redistributes the tariff revenue to (or taxes for financing 
the subsidy on) households in a lump-sum manner. Then the domestic pri e ofgood j is 
 8  The multi-economy odels deal with the North-South problem, that is, they try to answer whether 
growth rates of North and South converge or not as a result of trade in final goods, intermediate goods, 
and/or knowledge. F enstra (1996) gives asynthesis. Making use of an R&D-based model, he claims 
that whether knowledge diffuses across borders is essential forconvergence. 
9 From (3.4),  r =  pxxla, (3.6), (3.7), x =  x1 + x2, (3.9), (3.10), and A = nv, we get he static 
budget constraint:  p1(C1 +  p2(C2 —Y2) =  T  . 
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given by  p (t)  =  (1+  6  (0)  p  (t)  , and the government's budget constraint is expressed 
as  T  =61p1(C1-1D+62(C2  —1'2). 
    Let us consider how patterns of pecialization are determined. From (3.2) and (3.5), 
relative cost of good 1 to good 2 is defined as
 c=  c1(4,w)1  c2(Px,w) 
                       =  n(a2-ai)Ica-1)  c(n ;  c'  (n) > 0.
The larger n is, the lower the relative price of intermediate goods as a whole to labor, 
and then the higher the cost of the labor-intensive finalgood relative tothe intermediate-
good-intensive one.It is important to note that the relative cost depends on n alone, not 
the allocation f final goods. This says that the production possibility frontier is linear. Let 
h denote hreshold level of n at which both final goods are produced given  p1 and p2. 
It is implicitly defined as
 Pi  1  P2  =  WO- (3.13) 
The economy specializes in good 1 (or 2) if and only  jeo 
                     n(t) < (or  >)ii(t).
In Fig. 3.1, ray On(t) represents (3.5) for a particular value of  n(t). The slope of 
 c2 (Px, w) =  p2  (t) seen from the horizontal xis must be steeper than thatof 
 c1(Ps,w)=  p1(t) for any common relative input price  Px  /w, since those slopes 
represent relative input intensities X2  /L2 and  X1/4 respectively, and good 2 is 
intermediate-good-intensive. In free trade,  of (t) is determined so that ray  0/1f (t) 
cross the intersection f  c10=  pi  (t) and  c2(-)  =  1  .11 In the illustrated case, 
n(t)  <  n  f  (t)  , and then the economy specializes in good 1, since firms in the sector offer 
higher input prices than those in the other sector. The equilibrium values of  Px  (t) and 
w(t) are given at point  A  .
    The next hing to consider is the dynamics. If the economy specializes in good  j  , 
(3.11) and (3.12) reduce to
 1° If  n(t)  =  n(t), the conomy is diversified, but he xact production allocation is indeterminate. 
Since this happens by tiny chance, the case is not pursued. 
 11 From (3.13),  n  f(t) is implicitly determined as  pi (t) =  f  (0). 
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               y„ =  maxIL  /  an -  (1  -ctila)(piYi  /E)z,0}, (3.14) 
                  yz =  (a  I  o-)(p  iYi  I  E)z -  y„ - p. (3.15) 
    Fig. 3.2 shows how the equilibrium dynamics i determined. ScheduleNN  iN 
represents (3.14), while  2 = 0 locus corresponding to (3.15) is given by schedule  Z  iZ  . 
Assuming at the moment that  y„ >  0  , the equilibrium values of z and  y„ are solved 
from (3.14) and (3.15)  as12 
 z=  [E  l(p  iYi)](L  I  an  +  z 
                  y„  =  (11  a)[ce  iL  I  a„  -(o-  -  a  i)p]---s.  y„i.
The two schedules intersect at  S in the positive orthant (i.e.  y„ > 0) if and only if 
 Llan>  p(6-ai)lai. 
For R&D to occur, the effective labor endowment measured in terms of productivity in
R&D L  1  a„ must be so large that it should not be used up by the other  activities.13 In 
equilibrium, the economy jumps to the steady state  S1 in the initial period, and stays 
there with positive constant growth rate of n  .14 
    On the other hand, if and only if  L  I  a„ p(a  -ai)lai, the steady state  Si is 
given at the intersection of schedule  ZiZ and the vertical part of schedule  NNiN, 
where z =  [E.  l(p  iYi)]pa  I  a  zj  . 
    We now concentrate on thecase of the poverty trap: history together with an 
external environment forces the economy to endure zero growth, despite that it has a 
potential to  grow. The poverty trap is characterized by the following three conditions. 
12  Z
i = L  a„ + p  =  4 in free trade, while z1 > (or  <).21; if and only if there exists animport 
tariff (or an export subsidy). This is verified from the government's budget constraint and the 
household's static budget constraint. 
13  From (3.14) and (3.15), we have  y,, =  Lla„—(1—aila)(Lla„+p). The second term in the 
right-hand si e represents thetotal labor demand from the good- j and the intermediate good firms. 
 14  This can be proved inthe same way as Grossman d Helpman (1991, pp. 60-61). 
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 p(o--a2)1a2<Llans p(a-ai)lai, 
 n(0) < n f (0), 
 Osy  f  <  [(a2-a1)1(6-1)]yn2. 
The first condition implies that the economy can grow at the rate  y  n2 > 0 if it specializes 
in good 2, but it can not grow if it specializes in good 1. The second says that he 
economy specializes in good 1 in free trade in the initial period. The third means that 
either the world relative price of good 2 is constant or it falls more slowly than the 
relative cost of the small open economy if it specializes in good 2. The world relative 
price of the intermediate-good-intensive to the labor-intensive finalgood may fall at a 
constant rate in the steady state if each economy in the rest of the world also conduct 
R&D. Under these assumptions, the economy specializes in good 1 and does not grow 
forever infree trade. However, if the economy continues to pecialize n good 2 and to 
grow until the relative cost of good 2 becomes lower than the world relative price, after 
that he economy will be able to grow by  itself. Unfortunately, the economy can not 
escape from the poverty rap only by private incentives. 
3.4 Trade policy 
    How can the government induce the trapped economy to grow by using trade 
policy? In Fig. 3.1, suppose that he government raises the price of good 2 so that 
n(t) >  nd  (t)  , where  hd (t) is the threshold with distortion in period  t.15 Raising both 
sides to the  (a2—a1)1(a  —1)th power, and noting (3.13), we get 
                  n(t)("2-"')/('-') >  p1  (t)  /(1  + 6 2(t)).
The value of  62(t) which satisfies the above inequality is expressed as 
 1+  62 =  131  (t)[n(t)(1-  e(0)1(al-a2)  A .  -1)  ;c(t)  E (0,1). (3.16) 
 15  Now the quilibrium values of Px (t) and w(t) are given atpoint  B. 
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Under such  62(t), the economy specializes in good 2, with n growing at  y.2. Note 
that  62(t) now becomes an export subsidy.16 
    Remarkably, the protection need not be permanent. Since the economy specializes 
in good 2, n(t) grows faster than  of (t)  .17 Once n(t) exceeds  of  (t)  , the economy can 
grow without aid. Moreover, it is possible to reduce the degree of protection gradually. 
All the government has to do is to control  62(0 so that  ftd(t) be smaller than n(t) all 
the time. Since n(t) grows,  hd (t) can be raised by reducing  62(t)  . Note that z rises 
during that period, since the tax burden to finance the subsidy decreases. See Fig. 3.2. If 
 62(0> 0, schedule  NN2N (representing (3.14)) and schedule  Z2Z (representing 
(3.15)) intersect at S2  ,which is vertically below  SI  , the steady state in free trade with 
specialization in good 2. As  62(t) goes down,  S2 approaches toward  SI  .18 To sum 
up, 
Proposition 3.1. The trapped economy can grow with n growing at the constant rate 
y„2 by giving an export subsidy to good 2 according to (3.16). The protection can be 
temporary and the degree of it can be reduced gradually. During the period of gradual 
trade liberalization, z rises and approaches to  z2f  = L  I  an +  p  . 
    From the normative point of view, the effect of the entire path of protection on 
welfare must be evaluated. For example, consider the following  minimum  protection 
policy. Reduce  62(t) so that  net  ( ) be infinitesimally smaller than n(t) in any period, 
and remove the protection ce n(t) exceeds  of  (t). Formally, the path of the 
minimum-protection pol cy  16;  (t)} is described as 
          1 +  62* (t) =  pi (0)  exp(y  f t)[n(0)  exp(y.2t)(1  —  c)r-a2)10.-1), (3.17) 
16 Taking account of quantitative measures in the present model
, an import quota on good 2 is not 
sufficient for takeoff. The government must even impose a minimum export requirement on good 2 and 
compensate the exporters of good 2 for the difference between domestic and the world prices. If we 
choose the path of the minimum export requirement so that it should give the path of implicit subsidy 
rate being the same as  {62(t)}, this policy is equivalent to the xport subsidy considered in the text. 
17 Inverting (3.13), we have  ill. (t) =  pi  (t)(a-""2-"1)  . Together with the assumption of y  f , this 
 Yi 
implies that  y.f =  [(a  —1)1(a2—al)]y  <y„2. 
18 The economy must be always at the intersection of the two schedules
, since all households and firms 
foresee the path of protection and act according to it in any period. 
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where  s is an infinitesimal positive constant. The period of complete liberalization u der 
the minimum-protection p licy is identified by letting  62*  (t)  = 0 in (3.17) and solving it 
for  t.  It  is 
t =  (1/  A){1n  pi (0)  -  [(a2  - a  1)  1(o-  -1)]  ln  n(0)  - [(a2  - al  )/(cr  - 1)]1n(1  -  e)1  t*  ;(3.18) 
 A  =  [(a2-a1)1(a  -1)]y„2  -  yrf  >  0. 
At  t* and thereafter,  620=  0  . The following proposition claims that he minimum-
protection policy is actually  optima1.19 
Proposition 3.2. The  minimum-protection policy characterized by (3.17) and (3.18) is 
the optimal trade policy for growth in the trapped economy. 
Proof. This is proved with the help of Fig. 3.3. First, if we take  62(t), the production 
point is given at point  Y2(t), and the consumption point  C* (t) is at the intersection f 
the world price line and the budget line associated with  6;  (t)  . Next, take 
 62* (t)(>  6; (t)) arbitrarily. This does not alter the production allocation. However, the 
marginal rate of substitution f good 1 to good 2 at point  C* (t) is larger than the 
relative price, so the consumption point moves on the world price line to the southeast, 
say point  C**(t). Since point  C  **  (t) lies strictly inside the budget set associated with 
 62(t),  C* (t) is strictly directly revealed preferred to  C'(t). Q.E.D. 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
    This paper provides one theoretical explanation for infant industry protection and 
gradual trade liberalization. For the infant industry argument to make sense, the effective 
labor endowment measured in terms of productivity in R&D must be within an 
appropriate range, the initial number of varieties of intermediate goods must be 
 19  Taking the minimum-protection policy might be worse than doing nothing. Extremely high and fast-
growing  pi discourages the government from carrying t out by increasing the benefit of free trade 
and the cost of the protection: terms of trade in exporting good 1 is very favorable; the volume of the 
protection is very large and its duration is very long. Let us assume that this is not the case. 
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sufficiently small, and the world relative price of the intermediate-good-intensive to th
labor-intensive final good must not fall so fast. In this case, temporary protection of the 
intermediate-good-intensive final good sector with larger dynamic increasing returns 
leads the otherwise trapped economy to take off. Although growth requires protection, 
the degree of it can be gradually reduced to zero. And actually it should from the 
viewpoint of households. 
    This paper shares ome features with Fung and Ishikawa (1992). First, the initial 
condition determines ither the zero-growth or the positive-growth equilibrium. Second, 
starting growth in the naturally zero-growth economy requires only temporary 
government intervention. On the other hand, this paper departs from Fung and Ishikawa 
(1992) in an important respect. By incorporating intertemporal nd intratemporal 
optimization by households, which is absent in Fung and Ishikawa (1992), this paper 
gives the normative criterion for the optimal government intervention. When the 
government takes trade policy, the optimal one is gradual, not radical, trade liberalization. 
    The major drawback of the model is its Ricardian production structure. Import-
substituting policy necessarily results in changing the pattern of specialization, and hence 
the pattern of trade. However, it is the very structure that gives rise to discrete potential 
steady states with high or low (especially, zero) growth. As a result, this paper succeeds 
in explaining the East Asian policy experiences theoretically.
58
w hf (t) 
                                 n(t) 
 hd  (t) 
   A 4B 
              IP ci(Px,w) =  Pi  (t) 
                                     c2(Px ,w) =1+ 62 (0 
 C2  (Px  7  W)  =1 
0  Px
Fig. 3.1.
 59
Fig. 3.2.
60
good 2 
Y2(t) 
            Q* (t) 
                   c** 
                             slope=  p  (t)  1(1 + (t)) 
0  good  1
        slope=  p (t) slope=  pif(OM+  6  ; (t))
Fig. 3.3.
61
4 Conclusion 
    This dissertation has presented new contributions to the literature on international 
trade, economic growth and development. It contains one survey on the open 
endogenous growth theory and two chapters which analyze the effect of trade policy on 
 growth and welfare. 
    Chapter 1 sorts out main issues in trade and growth. Three topics are addressed: 
trade policy, growth and welfare; convergence or divergence; technology transfer. First, 
active trade policy can be justified in terms of growth and welfare provided that the 
economy has some kinds of market failure such as externalities, imperfect competition, 
and so on. Second, convergence between North and South is likely to occur if South 
imports advanced technology from North in some way. Third, growth in the world is 
hastened by intellectual property rights protection in the case that Northern 
multinational corporations work as the channel of technology transfer. 
    Chapter 2 examines the relationships among tariff revenue, government 
expenditure and growth in a small open economy. The model assumes external 
economies in capital accumulation. If the government spends the revenue raised at 
customs for such a productive use as promoting the demand for capital service, which is 
insufficient under laissez faire, deviating from free trade is growth- and welfare-
enhancing. 
    Chapter 3 gives a rationale for infant industry protection and gradual trade 
liberalization. The model assumes external economies in R&D and monopolistic 
competition. Depending on history and an external environment, the small open 
economy may fall into the poverty trap in free trade: it completely specializes in the 
labor-intensive good and can not grow. In this case, releasing the economy from the 
poverty trap requires only temporary protection of the infant industry, that is, the 
intermediate-good-intensive sector. Moreover, the minimum-protection type of gradual 
trade liberalization followed by free trade is actually the optimal trade policy. 
    The main contribution in this dissertation is to set out two theoretical cases in 
which trade intervention is good for growth and welfare of developing economies. The 
results obtained here coincide with the facts that some HPAEs still impose the tariff 
rates of more than 10% and that the tariff rates in the HPAEs are falling gradually. 
    Let us close this dissertation by pointing out some remainingissues which are 
related to the growth experience in East Asia. First, extending the North-South 
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endogenous product cycle models to more than two economies may generate some new 
insights. It is widely recognized that Japan is losing its market shares of consumer 
electronics and heavy industry products to the other HPAEs, which in turn are losing the 
share of light industry products to China and the other low-wage economies. Classifying 
the economies into high-income, middle-income, and low-income ones, for example, 
helps explain why the middle-income economies such as Korea and Taiwan are the 
fastest-growing of all. 
    Second, it is interesting to deal with changes in the composition of R&D: 
imitation and innovation in a developing economy. In the early phase of development 
after the second world war, the Japanese firms mainly imitated technology of the 
American firms. As the Japanese approached the world technological frontier, they 
began to place more importance on innovation, with the growth rate becoming lower. 
The other HPAEs are going to have similar experiences. How does the composition of 
R&D affect the growth rate? It is necessary to develop the multi-economy endogenous 
growth models.
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